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Guatemala emerged from a murder-riven campaign season to hold relatively peaceful and orderly
unsurprising general elections. At the ticket-tops, Alvaro Colom was the victorious presidential
contender, followed, slightly more distantly than the polls had predicted, by Otto Perez Molina. The
center-left Colom beat right-winger Perez 28% to 23%. Because he failed to gain more than 50% of
the vote in the crowded, 14-horse race, Colom will face Perez in a Nov. 4 runoff.
Foreign election observers were, just days before the election, ruefully predicting a bloody electionday following four months of campaigning that saw more than 50 candidates, their relatives, and
activists killed (see NotiCen, 2007-08-30). A much-relieved Wolfgang Kreissl Dorfler, head of the
European Union (EU) monitoring mission, told the world on shortwave radio, "In comparison with
four years ago, the situation is really quiet. What we have seen is a very well-organized election at
the polling stations, especially because the participation of young women and the young people is
very high."
The election was to some extent a referendum on the country's endemic violence. The international
media rarely miss a chance to remind that, with 6,000 murders in the last year, this country of 13
million or so has one of the highest murder rates in the world. Colom and Perez represent polar
opposite approaches to the problem. Perez Molina is a former army general, running under the
banner of the rightist Partido Partriotica (PP). His campaign has centered on delivering the country
from crime with a return to the death penalty and a 50% increase in the size of the police force.
Colom of the Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), by contrast, has promised an overhaul of the
notoriously corrupt security forces and dysfunctional judicial system.

Other races
These tight results were not seen at other levels in the comprehensive elections. For mayor of the
capital, Guatemala City, for instance, Alvaro Arzu of the Partido Unionista (PU) won with more than
55% of the vote, more than twice that of his closest competitor. This will be his third term. Between
mayoralties, Arzu served a term as president (1996-2000). He presents himself as a technocrat and
has been winning with that strategy for years. "We waged a different campaign from the others,
one that is not about offers and inducements but about attainments, works, not words. We've been
campaigning for 40 years," he told supporters in a victory speech.
Arzu is a comfortable constant on a continually changing political horizon. His political apparatus
has been in place for 20 years and has lasted longer than the political parties with which he has
run. He tends to be believed when he tells constituents, "We didn't come three months before to
say what we're going to do; we have been saying what we're going to do for years, so our job starts
today." Quetzaltenango, the second-largest city in the country, in the western highlands, also went
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for continuity and stability, re-electing Jorge Rolando Barrientos Pellicer, candidate of the Gran
Alianza Nacional (GANA).
In the legislature, three parties will dominate, UNE, GANA, and the PP. UNE will be the major
party with as many as 60 deputies; the other two will have between 30 and 40 each. The Frente
Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) took a licking to end up as the fourth-most-numerous delegation
in the unicameral 158-seat body. Just one presidency ago it was the dominant force, and during the
current administration of President Oscar Berger it had 43 seats from which to wield its influence
under the leadership of former de facto president Gen. Efrain Rios Montt (1982-1983). This time, it
will have just 12-14. Rios Montt will be one of those deputies, ensuring his immunity from human
rights abuse charges for another term (see NotiCen, 2007-01-04).
Because they represent no one in particular other than the political bosses and the candidates they
run, political parties in Guatemala come and go, and usually fall into decline after producing a
single presidency. GANA, for instance, produced President Berger but was itself formed from the
ruins of three other parties, among them the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), the party that
produced the Arzu presidency.
That being the case, it is of interest whenever a new party emerges and elects a credible number of
deputies. The honor this time falls to the Partido del Centro de Accion Social (CASA). It could end
up with as many as six deputies and would be the only new force in the legislature. The elections
give, and they take away. Thus, seven parties could come up empty, among them the Democracia
Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) and the PAN, both of which have produced presidents in the past,
Marco Venicio Cerezo (1986-1991) and Arzu, respectively. They could be slated for disappearance
along with other parties like the Union Democratica (UD), Desarrollo Integral Autentico (DIA), and
Frente por la Democracia.
The parties that do die will become grist for the political recycling mill. The runoff candidates will
need them in November. "This means being tolerant and opening the doors to be able to create a
national project," said Colom. For Perez Molina, by contrast, it does not mean being tolerant at all.
His party, whose logo is a clenched fist, is looking for people like street vendor Jose Martinez, who
wants members of the infamous street gangs off his street, by whatever means. "I'd like to get the
gang members, take them to jail, and leave them there," he said.
This has provided a winning strategy in the past for other iron-fisted candidates. Rampant street
crime worked for Rios Montt when he cleaned up the streets of Guatemala City with extrajudicial
executions that were well-tolerated by citizens sick of living in fear. Now Perez wants to declare
Army-enforced states of emergency and liberal use of a death penalty that is still on the books but
rarely used after televised executions were botched with the world watching.
In the first, in the 1990s, an entire firing squad managed to miss killing the condemned victim,
leaving its commander to approach the hapless victim and empty his pistol into his head as he
jerked and thrashed about. Perez has reason to believe memories are short when it comes to capital
punishment, but the former general will have a problem in the highlands and former war zones
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among indigenous communities that will not easily forget the massacres. "He is a soldier, and
soldiers are brutal; they did a lot here," said Ana Bor from the town of San Juan Sacatepequez, not
far from the capital.
Perez was part of the Army's negotiating team that brokered the end to the 36-year internal war,
but he has also been personally accused of atrocities. He is a member of the Kaibiles, the ruthless
cult-like elite troops of the Army, and commanded troops in the El Quiche department in the 1980s,
the scene of many indigenous massacres. Rounding out his resume, he served as commander of the
dreaded Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP), an infamous military hit squad and presidential guard,
albeit under the benign presidency of Ramiro de Leon Carpio (1993-1999).

Candidates different as night and day
It is a stark choice offered the electorate: another strongman who promises a crackdown on crime, or
a leftist economist who promises to cure the state of its weaknesses and create an economy in which
fewer people will need to turn to crime and violence. The choice could be determined by economic
status and geography as much as by anything else. "Here in Guatemala, if you leave your house,
only God knows if you're going to come back alive. The general will bring us security," said Eduardo
Perez, a businessman from the city of Antigua. "We're hoping for a change, for more work and more
jobs. I like the proposals Colom has made," said Jose Emilio Xolix of San Juan Suchitepequez, where
there is little crime, but little work.
Colom carried these voters to his five-point victory with his anti-poverty plan, a Program for
Government. Colom, who incidentally studied for years to become a Mayan priest even though
he is white, defeated Perez Molina in 18 of the country's 21 departments, and in some highlands
communities outpolled him by better than 2 to 1. In the urban areas, Perez turned the tables,
winning by the same big margins in central Guatemala City among whites and ladinos. They are
certain that his EMP credentials and "Mano dura, cabeza y corazon" slogan will have credibility
within the criminal classes.
Many analysts credit the extreme violence of this campaign with giving Perez Molina a boost that
overcame a Colom lead that at one time amounted to more than 20 points. Now, said political
scientist Francisco Garcia, "the small margin will make it difficult for Colom to form alliances and
pull in the political parties" that lost in the vote. Garcia believes the GANA and FRG votes will go
to Perez. Analyst Victor Galvez said much is riding for Perez on which of several possible narratives
the electorate chooses to embrace.
Perez is tainted with the atrocities of the war and has even been implicated in the killing of Bishop
Juan Jose Gerardi (see NotiCen, 2001-06-14). But he is also identified with the reformists within the
army. He opposed the Fujimori-style auto-coup of President Jorge Serrano Elias (1991-1993) and
before that sided with de facto president Gen. Humberto Mejia Victores (1983-1986) in bringing
down the Rios Montt presidency. In the end, toughness might provide the most appealing story
for an electorate that has lived for decades in fear of whatever their leaders have told them to
fear, communism, gangs, narcotraffic, street crime, the many different names for violence and the
justification for counterviolence.
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Galvez thinks this is the story that will work for Perez. "People are desperate," he said. "Rich, poor,
middle class, they're all suffering from this violence. They say, 'This man has the guts for this fight.'"
Colom, having seen his lead diminish as the country loses faith in the prospect of civil governability,
has moved quickly to make alliances with those who fared poorly in this election. He, too, can count
on a fear dividend.
A return to military rule is still a frightening thing in Guatemala, and there is plenty of concern for
this most fragile of democracies being ground beneath the heel of a jackboot. Galvez says of Perez
Molina, "Half the things he's proposed doing, he can't do, because it's not 1982 anymore. People
are expecting drastic and quick solutions, but you just can't declare a state of siege to fix the crime
problem."
Colom also has some advantage as populations exchange old fears for new ones. The brutal
campaign to install the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has engendered an anticapitalist tide that does not yet rival anti-communism but is showing signs of tender new growth.
Colom has said, "Capitalism is good at creating wealth but is bad at distributing it," and he has
admonished, "The capitalists or the bourgeois are slaves to their wealth, and the poor are slaves to
their poverty." Though substantially less free-market friendly than the general, Colom is conceding
nothing and started his pre-runoff campaigning aggressively seeking support wherever he could
find it.
Within 24 hours of the election, he had met with several new opposition mayors about switching
allegiances. He has reportedly added GANA's Nito Palencia of San Jose del Golfo, Tulio Meda of
Fraijanes, and Jorge Punay of Churrancho to the 97 mayoralties UNE has won around the country.
He pointed out to the media that he will be getting support from other mayors who will not change
parties. Municipal officials are permitted this kind of split partisanship.
The biggest prize among the mayors, of course, would be Arzu. Colom has already met with him,
but no deals have been reported. Arzu has denied any formal alliance between his Partido Unionista
and UNE, but it is commonly held that Arzu has respect for Colom's abilities and has praised his
tenure as head of the Fondo Nacional para la Paz (Fonapaz) during Arzu's presidency.
Figuring in any possible deal would be a PU alliance with UNE in the legislature. Perez has also
gone to see the mayor and is said to have offered him a number of inducements. "There are many
things that can be done together, we believe in a more visible police force, a community police, as
well as a minister who works together with the mayor's office," said Perez. But no deals have been
cut. Perez came away from the meeting saying that Arzu would not support either candidate in the
second round.
GANA's leader and third-running presidential candidate Alejandro Giammattei has also met with
the two winners. While GANA's business base would seem to favor Perez, there is also the matter
of continuity with GANA programs already in process in the Berger administration. Giammattei
said GANA would use its position to press these and to further its legislative agenda. He said a
committee had been formed to deal with the question of whom to support.
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